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  This paper analyzes public intervention in education, taking into 
account the existence of two educational levels: basic education and 
college education. The government decides per capita expenditure at 
each level and the subsidy for college education. We explore the effects 
of transferring resources from one level to the other on equity and 
efficiency, where efficiency refers to average productivity of college 
graduates. Except in the special case in which the economy is at the 
Equity-Efficiency Frontier (EEF), there is always a policy reform that 
increases the productivity of college graduates without excluding the 
talented poor from college. For developed countries, this policy consists 
of transferring resources from college to basic education. 
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 31 Introduction
In most countries, public expenditure on education accounts for a large proportion
of total expenditure on education. For the OECD countries, an average of 87% of
expenditure on all levels of education came from public sources in 2004.1 Public in-
tervention is present at all educational levels, from pre-primary to tertiary education.
However, countries di⁄er dramatically according to how they allocate resources across
the di⁄erent educational levels. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 1 show data on yearly per
student expenditure at basic and tertiary education, respectively.2 In Column 3 we
compute the ratio between expenditure per student in tertiary education and in basic
education. We observe a large heterogeneity. The ratio ranges from 1.00 in Italy to
3.23 in Mexico, with an average for the OECD of 1.68. Columns 4 and 5 show the
change in annual expenditure per student from 1995 to 2004 and the ratio between
both indexes is reported in Column 6. Fifteen countries out of twenty one have a
ratio lower than one, meaning that in this period they have diverted resources from
tertiary to basic education, at least in relative terms.
Since Table 1 refers only to annual expenditure, we present some additional ev-
idence in Table 2. Here we show data compiled by the OECD on cumulative ex-
penditure at basic and tertiary education, taking into account the duration of each
educational level. Again we observe large di⁄erences across countries. In Column 3
we compute the ratio between cumulative expenditure at both levels and we see that
it ranges from 0.36 in Korea and New Zealand to 0.98 in The Netherlands.
1See Table B3.1, Education at a Glance 2007, OECD.
2Basic education corresponds to primary, secondary, and post-secondary non-tertiary education.
4Table 1. Expenditure on education by level, 2004a
Expenditure per studentb Change 1995-2004c
Country Basic Tertiary T/B Basic Tertiary T/B
Australia 6,911 14,036 2.03 138 101 0.73
Austria 8,938 13,959 1.56 122
Belgium 7,596 11,842 1.62
Czech Rep. 5,490 6,752 1.68 124 69 0.56
Denmark 8,492 15,225 1.79 121 123 1.02
Finland 6,660 12,505 1.88 122 110 0.90
France 7,262 10,668 1.47
Germany 6,983 12,255 1.75 105 107 1.02
Greece 4,931 5,593 1.13 192 151 0.79
Hungary 3,833 7,095 1.85 157 73 0.47
Iceland 8,138 8,881 1.09
Ireland 6,034 10,211 1.69 181 126 0.70
Italy 7,741 7,723 1.00 105 130 1.23
Japan 7,105 12,193 1.72 127 101 0.79
Korea 5,550 7,068 1.27
Mexico 1,789 5,778 3.23 130 110 0.85
Netherlands 6,914 13,846 2.00 136 101 0.75
New Zealand 5,815 8,866 1.52
Norway 9,772 14,997 1.53 109 103 0.95
Poland 2,998 4,412 1.47 183 90 0.49
Portugal 5,400 7,741 1.43 154 98 0.64
Slovak Rep. 2,562 6,535 2.55 155 111 0.71
Spain 5,892 9,378 1.59 136 167 1.24
Sweden 7,744 16,218 2.09 117 99 0.84
Switzerland 10,378 21,966 2.12 105 134 1.28
UK 6,656 11,484 1.73 120 93 0.78
USA 9,368 22,476 2.40 130 132 1.01
OECD average 6,608 11,100 1.68 138 109 0.79
aSource: Education at a Glance 2007, Tables B1.1a and B1.5 and authors￿calculations.
bAnnual expenditure per student in US dollars, using PPPs.
cIndex of change in annual expenditure per student, setting expenditure in 1995 at 100.
5Table 2: Cumulative public expenditure on education, 2004a
Educational Levelsb
Country Basic Tertiary T/B Subs.c C. Att.d Expendituree
Austria 106,396 73,983 0.70 93.7 37 120.063
Belgium 86,320 35,406 0.41 90.4 34 99.317
Denmark 109,777 56,332 0.51 96.7 55 131.468
Finland 79,900 60,659 0.76 96.3 73 101.830
France1 86,406 42,884 0.50 83.9 39 100.551
Germany 87,659 65,732 0.75 86.4 37 100.437
Greece 58,850 29,361 0.50 97.9 33 66.157
Hungary 47,469 36,353 0.77 79.0 68 53.090
Iceland 113,213 32,770 0.29 90.9 79 123.877
Ireland 82,479 33,083 0.40 82.6 44 93.587
Italy 103,871 55,751 0.54 69.4 55 110.102
Japan 84,930 49,624 0.58 41.2 43 95.804
Korea 67,567 24,242 0.36 21.0 48 70.162
Mexico 22,662 19,761 0.87 68.9 29 25.128
Netherlands 74,339 72,555 0.98 77.6 56 94.256
N. Zealand 74,745 27,042 0.36 60.8 89 79.803
Slovak Rep. 32,856 25,484 0.78 81.3 47 36.230
Spain 69,993 43,699 0.62 75.9 44 83.171
Sweden 92,979 75,901 0.82 88.4 79 117.997
Turkey 15,396 12,474 0.81 90.0 26 16.724
UK 81,732 49,872 0.61 69.6 52 93.896
OECD average 75,216 43,951 0.61 78.2 32 86.364
aSource: Education at a Glance 2007, Table B1.3b and authors￿calculations.
bCumulative expenditure per student in 2004. In equivalent US dollars converted using PPPS for GDP.
cProportion of public expenditure in tertiary education in 2004. Source: Education at a Glance 2007, Table
B3.2b.
dEntry rates into tertiary-type A programmes for 2004. Source: Education at a Glance 2006, Table C2.1.
eTotal expenditure on education. Authors￿calculations.
1Year of reference for C. Att.: 2003.
Tables 1 and 2 document the existence of large di⁄erences in educational poli-
cies across countries. One possible explanation is that each country has di⁄erent
6objectives.3 In fact, the role of education is at the heart of current and quite di-
verse debates, such as poverty reduction or the challenge of new technologies. A
crucial question when analyzing public intervention is to establish the objectives of
educational policies. Most governments care for e¢ ciency and equity issues in a wide
sense. However, sometimes the problem is to give a precise meaning to these gen-
eral principles. To circumvent this problem we propose that equity concerns imply
that the objective of the government should be to facilitate everybody the access to
education, irrespective of family background. Regarding e¢ ciency we propose two
alternative objectives. The ￿rst objective consists of maximizing the productivity of
college students, while the second one is to maximize the average productivity of the
whole population.4 We study how these two objectives relate to each other and then
we analyze which policies should implement the government to achieve e¢ ciency and
equity at the same time. In particular, we want to study whether both objectives are
compatible or not and, if they are, which policies makes them compatible. Second, we
explore whether all countries, rich and poor, should apply the same policy to satisfy
these two objectives or if the policy reform is country-speci￿c.
To study these issues, and in line with the data in Tables 1 and 2, we build a
model with two educational stages: basic and college education. Basic education
comprises all mandatory levels of education and we assume it is fully ￿nanced by the
government. In contrast, college education is voluntary and students may have to pay
a part of the cost. Another di⁄erence is that expenditure on basic education a⁄ects the
quality of education, but not enrollment, since attendance is mandatory. On the other
hand, expenditure on college education a⁄ects not only quality, but also enrollment.
Individuals who go to college get a skilled job, while the rest remain unskilled. Due
to capital markets imperfections, some individuals su⁄er from borrowing constraints.
In our model, any public policy is characterized by two variables corresponding
to expenditure on basic and college education, respectively. We de￿ne the Equity-
E¢ ciency frontier (EEF) as the set of public policies for which it is not possible to
improve the two objectives of the government at the same time. The idea is similar
to that of the Pareto set in an Edgeworth Box. In general, except by chance, we
should not expect the economy to be at the EEF. Then, it is interesting to study if
there is always a policy reform that simultaneously satis￿es the objectives of equity
and e¢ ciency, where e¢ ciency means to maximize the average productivity of college
graduates. We prove that this is always the case. We also ￿nd that for rich countries,
this policy consists precisely of transferring resources from college education to basic
education. The intuition is that this policy reduces the threshold level of income
needed to attend college, but at the price of raising the threshold level of ability.
Since higher education is heavily subsidized in most of the rich countries, the ￿rst
e⁄ect is smaller in size and attendance reduces. However, due to the increase in the
3Alternatively, if two countries have exactly the same ￿xed and marginal costs, but di⁄erent
proportions of college students, they will not have the same expenditure per capita.
4See for example Lloyd-Ellis (2000), Su (2004) and Blankeneau et al (2007) who consider similar
criteria.
7threshold level of ability the productivity of skilled workers rises. In addition, this
policy has a positive e⁄ect on the productivity and the number of unskilled workers.
We also ￿nd that by transferring resources from college to basic education the average
productivity across the population as a whole rises. For low income countries, n the
contrary, the policy reform that has a positive e⁄ect on equity and at the same time
improves the productivity of skilled workers consists of transferring resources from
basic to college education. However, in general we ￿nd that this policy will have a
negative e⁄ect on the average productivity across the population.
Note that we focus on educational reforms, instead of focusing on the design of
an optimal educational policy. We start from a given division of the budget between
the two levels of education and we study the e⁄ect of diverting resources from one
educational level to the other. We believe that this is a sensible approach since most
governments, instead of introducing large reforms, introduce small reforms in several
steps.5
We discuss brie￿ y some previous works related to ours. Lloyd-Ellis (2000) studies
the impact of alternative allocations of public resources between basic and higher
education on enrollment, income distribution and growth, while Blankenau, Cassou
and Ingram (2007) investigate its output and welfare implications. However, none of
them consider individual heterogeneity with respect to family background, which is
one of our main focuses. Driskill and Horowitz (2002) study optimal investment in
human capital in a standard growth model, and they ￿nd that developing countries
should concentrate on advanced human capital, a result similar to ours. Restuccia
and Urrutia (2004) focus on intergenerational mobility and ￿nd that an increase in
expenditure on early education has more impact than an increase in college subsidies.
Su (2004) studies the dynamic e⁄ects of allocating public funds between basic and
college education. However, she abstracts from private education expenditure which
is a crucial factor a⁄ecting education outcomes. Finally, Romero (2008) considers
that voters decide how to split the budget between basic and college education and
he studies how the possibility of opting out from public education a⁄ects that decision.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the economy. In
Section 3 we consider the e⁄ect of public policies on the di⁄erent objectives of the
government and we illustrate our main result with numerical examples. Finally,
Section 4 concludes.
5This approach is similar to that in much of the literature on optimal commodity taxation which
focuses on local e⁄ects of tax changes. See Feldstein (1975), Guesnerie (1977), and King (1983)
among others.
82 Model
2.1 Individuals and Educational Sector
We build a model with two periods. In the ￿rst period there is a continuum of individ-
uals characterized by income y 2 [0;Y ] and innate ability a 2 [0;A]; where Y;A > 0:
The respective cumulative distribution functions are F(y) and G(a); although to get
closed-form solutions we will assume that a is uniformly distributed on its support.
We also assume that y and a are independently distributed.6
In the ￿rst part of the ￿rst period all children attend basic education, which is
compulsory. In the second and last part of the ￿rst period, individuals can either
get a job as unskilled workers or, alternatively, they can enrol in higher education
to become skilled workers. We call ￿ the fraction of time of the ￿rst period spent at
college and, thus, out of the labor force, where 0 < ￿ < 1:
In the second period, those individuals who attended college in the ￿rst period
get a skilled job, while those who did not remain in an unskilled job. Individuals care
for their consumption in the second period (C) which is equal to the value of their
lifetime income.
We assume a simple structure for the educational sector. The per capita cost of
providing basic education is denoted as cL > 0. Since basic education is compulsory,
we assume that its cost is paid in full by the government.7
Regarding higher education we want to separate public provision from public
￿nancing. The level of public provision is captured by cH > 0; which is the per
capita cost of providing higher education. This includes wages paid to teachers, the
cost of college equipment, laboratories, etc. The level of public ￿nancing of higher
education is captured by s; which represents the proportion of the total cost that the
government subsidizes. That is, the government pays cHs; while college students pay
cH(1 ￿ s); with 0 ￿ s ￿ 1. To simplify things, we assume that the subsidy is the
same for all individuals. We de￿ne as ￿ = cH=cL the ratio between both costs.8
We want to distinguish between public provision and public ￿nancing as each one
of them can be used by the government to achieve di⁄erent objectives. The parameter
cH, as well as cL in the case of basic education, captures the quality of education.
Increasing cH could be seen as a way of improving the quality of college education
which, in turn, may have a positive e⁄ect on the human capital of college graduates.
6As we will see below, college attendance is the proportion of individuals with ability and income
above some given thresholds. The assumption that a and y are independently distributed allows us
to study separately the e⁄ect of policy changes on college attendance through the e⁄ect on the two
thresholds.
7In 2003, only 7.4% of total expenditure in basic education in the OECD (primary, secondary
and post-secondary non-tertiary education) was privately ￿nanced.
8As in Blankeneau et al (2007) and Lloyd-Ellis (2000) we do not consider the existence of ￿xed
costs. One reason is of tractability. Another reason is that we are interested only in marginal
changes in per capita costs.
9However, for a ￿xed level of cH; an increase in s can be seen as a way of easing access
to college for individuals from low-income families.
2.2 College Attendance
Since individuals care only for their consumption in the second period C; their only
concern will be to maximize lifetime income. Next we de￿ne lifetime income for the
two types of workers, unskilled and skilled.
An individual who only attends basic education will be an unskilled worker for all
her remaining lifetime. We assume that her productivity and, thus, her wage wU will
be determined exclusively by per capita expenditure at basic education cL: We write
wU = wU(cL); and we assume this function to be increasing and weakly concave. Since
they work a fraction ￿ of the ￿rst period, they earn ￿wU(cL) and wU(cL) in the ￿rst
and second period, respectively. Their lifetime income is, therefore, (1 + ￿)wU(cL).9
If an individual goes to college she becomes a skilled worker. Her productivity
and thus, her wage, rises to wS(cL;cH;a); where we assume this function is increasing
and weakly concave with respect to the three arguments. Lifetime income of a skilled
worker will be wS(cL;cH;a) ￿ cH(1 ￿ s). An individual will choose higher education
if:
wS(cL;cH;a) ￿ cH(1 ￿ s) + (1 + ￿)wU(cL): (1)
We assume that this condition always holds for those individuals with the highest
ability A since, otherwise, nobody will choose a college education. In particular we
require:
wS(cL;cH;A) > cH + (1 + ￿)wU(cL); (2)
which means that, even when s = 0; the highest ability individual ￿nds always
pro￿table to attend college. Condition (1) will hold for those individuals with ability
a above a threshold b a; with 0 ￿ b a < A; which is implicitly de￿ned as:
wS(cL;cH;b a) = cH(1 ￿ s) + (1 + ￿)wU(cL): (3)
The e⁄ect of the di⁄erent parameters on the threshold value b a is as follows. Clearly, ￿
has a positive e⁄ect on b a while the e⁄ect of s is negative. This means that the higher
is s; the lower is the threshold b a: Some individuals that had decided previously not
to attend college because of their low level of ability, now ￿nd attending college
pro￿table. The e⁄ect of both cL and cH depend on the properties of the functions






















wS are the elasticities of wU and wS; respectively
with respect to cL. This would be the case if, for example, money spent on basic
education a⁄ects mainly the productivity of those who do not go to college. Finally,
9To simplify the analysis we assume that individuals do not discount future payo⁄s.
10to see the e⁄ect of cH on b a note that an increase in cH has two e⁄ects on b a: There is
a positive e⁄ect on wS and a negative e⁄ect on the cost of college cH(1 ￿ s): Which
one of them will prevail will depend on the value of the subsidy s: In particular, we
see that the e⁄ect of cH on b a will be positive as long as:
"
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wS is the elasticity of wS with respect to cH: This will not be the
case if s is close to 1. In such a case, the e⁄ect on the cost will be negligible and
the e⁄ect on wS will prevail, reducing b a. When s is small, the e⁄ect on the cost will
dominate, and the ￿nal e⁄ect on b a will be to rise it.
However, individuals must also be able to a⁄ord the tuition cost cH(1 ￿ s) to
attend college. They can use their income y and they have also access to a loan from
a bank. However, and due to capital market imperfections we assume that they can
borrow only up to an amount ￿cH(1 ￿ s); where 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1.10 The parameter ￿
captures the ￿quality￿of capital markets. This borrowing constraint, an exogenous
feature of the model, is assumed to be the same across individuals.11 The two polar
cases are ￿ = 0; which means complete impossibility of borrowing, and ￿ = 1 which
means that capital markets are perfect. So, the higher is ￿ the better is the quality
of capital markets.12
To attend college, therefore, individuals must have pre-tax income satisfying:
y ￿ b y(cH;s) = (1 ￿ ￿)cH(1 ￿ s): (6)
Those with income above cH(1￿s) do not need to ask for a loan. Those with income
below (1 ￿ ￿)cH(1 ￿ s) cannot a⁄ord college. Finally, those with income between
(1 ￿ ￿)cH(1 ￿ s) and cH(1 ￿ s) need a loan to attend college. The proportion of
individuals who can a⁄ord college is the proportion of individuals with pre-tax income
above b y; namely, 1 ￿ F(b y): When ￿ = 1 or s = 1; we get b y = 0 and the constraint
is not binding for any individual. To simplify notation we call p = 1 ￿ F(b y); and in
the sequel we assume that p > 0. The proportion of individuals attending college ￿
is the proportion of individuals who satisfy at the same time Conditions (1) and (6).




￿ (A ￿ b a): (7)
10Evidence by Cameron and Taber (2004) and others suggests that credit constraint are not
important in determining college attendance. In Section 4 we discuss how the main results of the
paper change by removing the assumption that credit constraints bind.
11Lochner and Monge-Naranjo (2002) build a model with endogenous borrowing constraints. Indi-
viduals of heterogeneous abilities or those making di⁄erent schooling choices face di⁄erent borrowing
constraints. We implicitly assume that banks cannot condition loans on ability, as they cannot ob-
serve it.
12The parameter ￿ could be alternatively interpreted as a policy variable. Many countries are
o⁄ering students￿loans to overcome this constraint. Then ￿ = 1 means that there is such a policy
in place, while ￿ = 0 means a complete absence of it.
11It is immediate to check that ￿ is increasing with ￿ and s. The derivative of ￿ with
respect to cL will be negative if Condition (4) holds. Finally, we want to analyze the
e⁄ect of cH on ￿: An increase in cH rises the tuition cost reducing p: At the same
time, the e⁄ect on the term (A ￿ b a) will depend on whether Condition (5) holds or
not. If it holds, these two e⁄ects go in opposite directions and the ￿nal e⁄ect will
depend on which of the two e⁄ects prevail. If Condition (5) fails, the e⁄ect of cH on
￿ will be unambiguously negative.
However, we want to stress that these results are just partial derivatives, since we
are not taking into account that the budget constraint of the government must hold
(see Section 2.3 below).
2.3 The Government Budget Constraint
Here we study how the three instruments of the government (cL;cH;s) are related
through the budget constraint. We de￿ne total expenditure in education E as:
E ￿ cL + scH￿: (8)
We call T the total ￿xed budget that government has to spend in education.13 We
assume that the government cannot run a de￿cit. Then the budget constraint is:
E ￿ cL + scH￿ ￿ T: (9)
For ￿xed values of cL and cH; we call b s the value of the subsidy for which the constraint
is satis￿ed with equality. If E < T for all values of the subsidy, then we set b s = 1: In
the next proposition we provide a simple condition that guarantees that b s exists and
that it is unique.
Proposition 1 Consider any combination (cL;cH) and assume that the ￿xed budget
T satis￿es that T > cL: Then, there is a unique value b s(cL;cH) ￿ 1 that satis￿es the
budget constraint.
Proof. When s = 0; we see that E = cL: Since ￿ is increasing with s; the function
E is strictly increasing in s: We have two possibilities. Either E is always below T;
in which case b s(cL;cH) = 1; or they cross at a value of the subsidy b s(cL;cH) strictly
below 1.
The condition that T > cL is required since, otherwise, even when college educa-
tion is not subsidized at all, the government would be running a de￿cit. For given
values of the parameters, the fact that the government has to satisfy the budget con-
straint implies that it has only two free policy instruments. We choose cL and cH as
13We assume T to be ￿xed. This could be either because it comes from taxes raised on the
previous generations, or because it is ￿nanced through lump-sum taxes that do not distort the
education decisions of the young. Our focus, however, is not on a comparison of ￿nancing schemes,
so we abstract from distortionary taxation.
12the two free parameters and we assume that the subsidy always adjusts to satisfy the
constraint. Since we are interested in policy changes, we want to know what is the
e⁄ect of changes in cL and cH on b s(cL;cH): To do this we assume that the equilibrium
is interior. In particular we de￿ne b s(cL;cH) as the value that satis￿es:
E(cL;cH;b s) ￿ T = 0: (10)

































@s ￿ 0; the signs of @b s
@cL and @b s
@cH will be negative if the terms in the numerator
are positive. Consider ￿rst that college attendance ￿ is not a⁄ected by either cL or
cH: Then, it is clear that both derivatives are negative. That is, rising either cL or
cH reduces the resources that can be used to subsidize higher education. However,
college attendance can also be a⁄ected negatively by the increase in cL or cH, reducing
the absolute value in the numerator. Intuitively, the negative e⁄ect on the subsidy is
attenuated, since now fewer individuals receive it. What we do is to assume that the
indirect e⁄ect through ￿ is not that large so as to o⁄set the initial negative e⁄ect.14
Assumption 1 (A.1): The following conditions hold: (i) @b s
@cH < 0 and (ii) @b s
@cL < 0.
We de￿ne an ￿iso-subsidy￿curve as the set of all combinations (cL;cH) giving rise



















By Assumption 1, this slope is negative, implying that there is always a trade-o⁄be-
tween expenditure on basic education and expenditure on college education. Holding
the subsidy ￿xed, if we increase one of them we have to reduce the other in order to
keep the budget balanced.
From Proposition 1 we also see that a ￿xed combination (cL;cH) corresponds to
di⁄erent values of the subsidy in two countries with di⁄erent educational budget T.
Using Equation (10) above, for a ￿xed (cL;cH); the equilibrium value of the subsidy
in a rich country (one with a high T) will be higher than in a less rich country. From
Equations (7) and (9) we also obtain that the equilibrium value of college attendance
will be also higher in the rich country than in the less rich country.
14In the Appendix we discuss which are the conditions that need for this to be true. Basically we
need to assume that the elasticities of ￿ with respect to both cL and cH are small in size.
13Figure 1: The policy space
In Figure 1 above we illustrate our policy space. We represent in black (respec-
tively, red) a rich (respectively, poor) country. The closer to the origin, the higher is
the value of the subsidy. The curved lines in the bottom part of the ￿gure represent
the combinations (cL;cH) for which Condition (2) holds. That is, below that line
nobody attends college and expenditure E is constant at E = cL. Point A in the
￿gure corresponds to a higher subsidy in a rich country than in a poor country. In
the example of the ￿gure the values of the subsidy are 0.85 and 0.6, respectively.
Finally we also see that for a ￿xed combination (cL;cH), the iso-subsidy curve
b s(cL;cH) is ￿ atter in a rich country rather than in a less rich country, provided that
both "￿
cH and "￿
cL are of small size.15 The intuition is simple. Consider a rich country
where both b s and ￿ take high values. If the government rises cH this policy will have a
large impact on expenditure because a lot of people are getting a substantial subsidy.
If nothing else is done, the subsidy should be reduced in a large amount. To hold the
subsidy ￿xed, a signi￿cant reduction of cL is needed. In the less rich country, on the
contrary, rising cH has a smaller e⁄ect on expenditure, since few people attend college
and the subsidy is low. The reduction needed in cL to keep the subsidy constant is
smaller.
3 Policy Reforms
We want to analyze policy reforms from an initial situation described by a particular
combination (cL;cH) through their e⁄ects on di⁄erent government objectives. As we
discussed in the introduction, we assume that the government wants to ful￿ll sev-
eral objectives at the same time. In particular, the government has both e¢ ciency
and equity concerns. Although we will be more precise below, by e¢ ciency we re-
15See the Appendix.
14fer to policies that improve the productivity of workers through investment in the
educational process. By equity we mean policies that foster equality of opportunities.
3.1 Equity
We assume that one of the government objectives is equity, as measured by equality
of opportunities. By this we mean the following. For a ￿xed value of innate ability
a; the probability of attending college is determined exclusively by income y. If the
government wants to maximize the probability of attending college for a given ability
level a; its objective will be simply to reduce as much as possible the threshold level of
income b y corresponding to that ability level. Since we are assuming that a and y are
independently distributed, that threshold is constant across ability levels. Then, for
any value of ￿ in Equation (6), to reduce the threshold b y amounts simply to reduce
cH(1 ￿ b s): Since both @b s
@cL and @b s
@cH are negative, this can be done by either reducing
cL or cH or both. Moreover, we see that the slope of b y in the policy space (cL;cH) is:
@cH
@cL






cH ￿ @b s
@cH
; (13)
which is negative. This means that, if we increase cH (respectively, cL); to hold b y
constant we have to reduce cL (respectively, cH):
3.2 E¢ ciency
First, we consider that the e¢ ciency objective of the government consists of increasing
the average productivity or the average human capital of college graduates. This
would be the case if the government is particularly concerned with improving the
productivity of skilled workers. Since an individual with ability a who attends college
has productivity wS(cL;cH;a); the average productivity of graduates, denoted by QS
is:
QS(cL;cH) = E[wS(cL;cH;a) j a > b a(cL;cH)]: (14)
An increase in either cL or cH has a positive e⁄ect on QS, which is assumed to be
concave with respect to both cL and cH. There is a positive direct e⁄ect through wS
and also an indirect positive e⁄ect because the threshold b a rises as well. In the space
(cL;cH) we can de￿ne an ￿iso-productivity￿curve as the set of combinations (cL;cH)












Since both cL and cH have a positive impact on wS; this slope is negative. If we reduce
cH (respectively, cL); to hold QS constant we have to increase cL (respectively, cH):
15In Figures 2a and 2b below we represent the level curves of QS (in blue), together
with those of b y (in red).
Figure 2a: cL and cH are complements
Figure 2b: cL is relatively more important
A second e¢ ciency objective consists of rising the average level of human capital
of the entire cohort of individuals, and not only that of college graduates. Recall
that a proportion 1￿￿ of the cohort has productivity wU(cL); while those attending









since only a proportion p of those with ability above the threshold b a can a⁄ord a
16college education. Using the de￿nition of QS above, we can also write QT as:
QT(cL;cH) = (1 ￿ ￿)wU(cL) + ￿QS(cL;cH); (17)
where the ￿rst term captures the aggregate level of human capital of unskilled workers
and the second term takes into account both the quantity and the quality of college
graduates. The di⁄erences with QS above are that now we also care for the produc-
tivity of unskilled workers and for college attendance. In particular, consider a policy
change that rises QS by transferring resources from college education to basic educa-
tion. If college attendance ￿ does not change, then QT will rise as well. However, in
general we should expect a change in college attendance. If college attendance gets
lower, the term on the left ((1 ￿ ￿)wU(cL)) gets higher, while the term on the right
(￿QS) can either rise or diminish. In fact, this second e⁄ect is always of a smaller
size, meaning that any policy that transfers resources from college to basic education
that has a positive e⁄ect on QS; will also have a positive e⁄ect on QT: To see this,
note that QT is always a convex combination of wU(cL) and QS(cL;cH): In the pol-
icy space (cL;cH) the level curves of QS have negative slope, while those of wU(cL)
are vertical lines. The level curves of QT must have, therefore, a slope between the
corresponding slopes of wU(cL) and QS(cL;cH):
In the next section we focus on our narrower de￿nition of e¢ ciency, namely QS.
We focus on QS for two reasons. First, the analysis is much simpler than with
QT. Second, given the current trend in most Western countries towards cutting
expenditure in higher education, we are interested in studying when it is the case
that the policy that makes equity and e¢ ciency compatible consists of rising cL and
reducing cH. Thus, given the relationship between the indi⁄erence curves of QS and
the other two concepts, if that policy has a positive e⁄ect on equity and QS, it will
also have a positive e⁄ect on QT.
3.3 Equity and College Productivity
We assume that the government is concerned about equity and about the quality
of college graduates. Our next objective is to ￿nd those combinations (cL;cH) that
take the economy to the equity-e¢ ciency frontier. We de￿ne those combinations as
follows:
De￿nition 2 The Equity-E¢ ciency Frontier (EEF) is the set of all combinations
(cL;cH) such that, for a given threshold level of income b y; college productivity QS is
maximized.
When both QS and b y are di⁄erentiable and quasi-concave functions (i.e, the up-
per contour sets of both functions are always convex sets), the EEF can be easily
characterized by the usual tangency condition. That is, the EEF is de￿ned as the set
of all combinations (cL;cH) such that:
@cH
@cL





￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
QS=QS
: (18)
17For an illustration see Figures 2a and 2b, where points A and B belong to the EEF.
The EEF represents all policy combinations such that the government cannot improve
equity without hurting e¢ ciency, or the other way round. For example, a movement
from A to B in Figure 2a or 2b increases e¢ ciency at the price of reducing equity.
Observe that, as long as QS is quasi-concave, we do not need b y to be quasi-concave.
It is enough to assume that for any combination (cL;cH); the upper contour set of
QS is a proper subset of the lower contour set of b y: In the Appendix we discuss the
issue of quasi-concavity of QS: We see that QS will be quasi-concave under very mild
assumptions.
Next we discuss the shape of the EEF in the policy space (cL;cH): This shape
will depend on the corresponding shapes of both QS and b y: One example is the case
in which QS is such that cL and cH are strong complements. Just for the purpose
of illustration, consider the case QS = minfcL;cHg: Then, rising cH has no e⁄ect on
college productivity if at the same time we do not increase cL: Then, the shape of
EEF will be as represented in Figure 2a. That is, its slope will be positive in the
space (cL;cH): However, for other technologies the contract curve may have a di⁄erent
shape in the policy space (cL;cH): For example, if money spent at early stages has a
deeper impact on college productivity than expenditure at later stages, the slope of
the EEF will be negative as represented in Figure 2b. The reason is that in this case
putting more resources into college education has hardly any e⁄ect on productivity.
The higher is QS; the more vertical become its level curves. Now, since the slope of
EEF is negative, a policy change that increases cL and reduces cH along the EEF,
will improve e¢ ciency at the price of reducing equity.
Finally, observe that there is no reason why a given economy should be actually
choosing an educational policy on the curve EEF. It is easy to see that, if an economy
is not at a policy combination on the EEF, there is no longer a trade-o⁄between equity
and e¢ ciency. The following corollary states this result.
Corollary 3 For all combinations that are not in the EEF:
(i) There is always a policy that improves the two objectives of the government.
(ii) This policy always consists of transferring resources from college to basic educa-
tion when the initial combination is to the right of the EEF or from basic to college
education if it is to the left of the EEF.
Proof. It is immediate from (18) and Figures 2a and 2b.
Consider, for example, the point C in both Figure 2a and Figure 2b. If the
government implements a policy reform in the direction of the green arrow, this
policy has a positive e⁄ect both on equity and e¢ ciency.
This corollary shows that, regardless of the shape of the EEF, the objectives of
equity and productivity are always compatible if the initial combination (cL;cH) is
not in the EEF, and it also provides a characterization of the direction of the policy
reform. What is crucial, therefore, is to identify for a given initial situation which is
the optimal policy change.
183.4 An illustration: Ability matters only at college
The above model is too general to derive policy recommendations. In the sequel,
therefore, we focus our attention to a particular example. In particular, we propose




wS(cL;cH;a) = wU(cL) + (cH)
￿a;
where 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ 1: The unskilled wage is determined exclusively by per capita expen-
diture at basic education. We also assume that the marginal productivity of cL does
not depend on ability.16 Attending college yields a positive premium that depends
both on ability a and on expenditure at college cH.17 Note also that the marginal
productivity of expenditure at college is higher for individuals of high ability than for
low-ability individuals. Finally we assume decreasing returns to expenditure at both
levels.
Using Equations (3) and (19) above, the threshold b a becomes:
b a(cL;cH) = (cH)















In the previous section we saw that having the two objectives in mind, equity and
e¢ ciency, imposes always a trade-o⁄ between basic education and college education
as long as the economy is not at a policy combination on the EEF. Here we obtain a
condition that characterizes whether the country is to the right or to the left of the
EEF. By identifying this condition we are able to provide a policy recommendation
for any given initial combination cL and cH.
In the next proposition we show that the particular policy to pursue depends
crucially on the values of the elasticities of b s(cL;cH) with respect to cL and cH:
Proposition 4 Suppose that wU(cL) and wS(cL;cH;a) are as in Equation (19). More-
over, suppose that the initial situation (cL;cH) corresponds to a situation that is not
in the EEF. Then, the particular policy reform that has a positive e⁄ect both on the
productivity of college graduates QS and on equity depends on the size of the elas-
ticity of b s(cL;cH) with respect to cL: If this elasticity is small in absolute terms, the
government should rise cL and reduce cH: If the elasticity is large in absolute terms,
the government should rise cH and reduce cL.
16This speci￿cation is similar to that used in Blankenau et al (2007) who also assumed that ability
matters only at college (or in the acquisition of speci￿c human capital in their model).
17See Su (2004) for a similar speci￿cation.
19Proof. The proof is very simple. We just have to compare the slopes of QS and b y in
the space (cL;cH); when wU(cL) and wS(cL;cH;a) are as in Equation (19). The slope













cH ￿ @b s
@cH
(22)
There are two possibilities: either the slope in Equation (22) is smaller than the slope
in Equation (13) or it is the other way round. In the ￿rst case, the only possibility of
achieving both objectives is by increasing cL while reducing cH: This is the situation
of point C in Figure 3 below, where we represent in green all policies satisfying both
objectives. In the second case, the way to achieve both objectives is by increasing cH
while reducing cL: This is point D in the ￿gure. We then see that which one of these
two cases prevails depends on the value of the elasticity of b s(cL;cH) with respect to












cH ￿ @b s
@cH
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+ (2 + ￿)(cL)
￿￿1 (1 ￿ b s): (24)
De￿ning the elasticities of b s(cL;cH) with respect to cL and cH as "s
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Condition (25) is more complicated than it seems, as it depends on b s and the
elasticities "s
cH and "s
cL which, in turn, depend on the speci￿c values of cL and cH.
If A ￿ 2 + ￿ and
cH








is bigger than 1. In this case, the
condition will be true as long as the elasticity of the subsidy with respect to cL in
absolute value is not much higher than the corresponding elasticity in absolute value
with respect to cH: In particular, whenever both elasticities are of comparable size,
the condition will be always ful￿lled.
If we consider two countries, one rich and one poor, it seems that the condition
is more likely to be ful￿lled in the rich country. The reason is that in rich countries,
college attendance is higher than in poor countries. Then, changes in cH will have a
deeper impact on the subsidy relative to changes in cL in rich countries, rather than
in poor ones. That is, the absolute size of "s
cH in rich countries relative to that of "s
cL
20will be higher than in poor countries. Below we run some numerical simulations that
seem to con￿rm this intuition.
In Figure 3 point C represents a situation in which Condition (25) holds. This
could be seen as the situation in many developed countries. As we move into higher
values of both cL and cH; the equilibrium level of the subsidy gets lower. At the same
time, we ￿nd that the iso-equity lines become steeper relatively to the iso-productivity
lines. This means that, as we move farther away from the origin, eventually Condition
(25) will fail. This is represented as point D in Figure 3.
Figure 3: The optimal policy depends on the value
of the subsidy
In addition, Proposition 4 shows that which is the policy reform for a given starting
point (cL;cH) depends on whether the country is rich or poor. Figure 4 represents the
policy reforms for two countries: one rich and one poor. In both cases, the dotted lines
represent the iso-productivity curves. The rich country (in black) has an educational
budget T: The poor country (in red) has educational budget T 0 < T: Thus, for a
￿xed combination (cL;cH); the subsidy in the rich country will be higher than in the
poor country and the iso-productivity lines will be steeper than the iso-equity lines.
The policy reform will consist of increasing cL. In the poor country, since the same
combination (cL;cH) corresponds to a much lower subsidy, the optimal policy reform
is just the opposite one.
21Figure 4: Optimal policy in a rich and a poor
country
Finally, we know that any policy that transfers resources from college education
to basic education and that respects both equity and college productivity will have a
positive e⁄ect on QT as well. What about when Condition (25) does not hold? We
saw that a policy that transfers resources towards higher education improves equity
and college productivity. However, this is done at the price of reducing the human
capital of those who do not attend college, and this may have at the end a negative
e⁄ect on QT: In fact, the only policy that both respects equity and has a positive
e⁄ect on QT is the one that transfers resources towards basic education.
3.5 A Numerical Example: High Income vs Low Income
Countries
Here we present a numerical example to illustrate Proposition 4. To do it we have
to ￿nd reasonable values of our parameters. This exercise should not be taken as
a full-￿ edged calibration exercise, since the model is too abstract to be calibrated
properly.
We need values for ￿; ￿; ￿; A and T: Once we have this, for every combination
(cL;cH) we can compute the equilibrium levels of the subsidy b s(cL;cH); college atten-
dance and productivity. In Table 3 we present our choice of parameter values. Below
22we describe brie￿ y our choices.







The value that we choose for ￿ re￿ ects the fact that the working life of an unskilled
worker is a 10% longer than that of a skilled worker. Since borrowing constraints
are not very important for most OECD countries we think that a value of ￿ close
to 1 should be appropriate. In particular, we choose ￿ = 0:75. To simplify our
computations, we choose ￿ = 1, although we comment below how results change when
we allow for strictly decreasing returns to public expenditure in education (￿ < 1).
Next we focus on A: The value of A determines the value of the college premium.
In particular, the college premium is an increasing function of A. We de￿ne the
college premium for an individual with ability a as the ratio between net lifetime
income attending and not attending college. Since a follows a Uniform distribution
on [0;A]; the average college premium can be written:
2 + ￿ + ￿(A ￿ (1 ￿ s))
2(1 + ￿)
: (26)
To obtain a value for ￿ and s we use OECD data from Table 2. Columns 1 and 2
correspond roughly to what we call in the paper cL and cH; respectively. In Column
3 (T/B) we compute the ratio ￿. Taking the mean values of ￿ and s for the OECD
(￿ = 0:61;s = 0:782), if we choose A = 1 we obtain an average college premium of
1.17, which seems reasonable. Moreover, choosing A = 1 simpli￿es our calculations
to a great extent.
Countries are classi￿ed as rich or poor according to the value of the educational
budget T. For each country in Table 2 we calculate T as follows. Using country data
for cL, cH, subsidies for higher education (Column Subs.) and college attendance
levels (C.Att.), we plug these numbers into Equation (9) to get a value for T. Next,
we divide the countries into two groups, according to their values of T: In particular,
we consider as poor countries those ￿ve in the ￿rst quartile, namely: Greece, Hungary,
Mexico, Slovak Republic and Turkey. We consider as rich countries the rest of the
OECD countries. The average values of T;cL; and cH are (approximately) T =
$40;000;cL = $35;000 and cH = $25;000 for poor countries and T = $100;000,
cL = $70;000 and cH = $40;000 for the rich countries.
23Once we have values for all our parameters, we can compute the equilibrium values
of b s, p and ￿ corresponding to any given combination (cL;cH) for the two groups of
countries.18 Next, we can derive the shape of the EEF. To do this we start by ￿xing
a particular value of cL: Then, we compute the value of cH that takes the economy
to the EEF. In other words, we ￿nd the value of cH such that the slopes of QS and
b y coincide. Next, we repeat the process with a di⁄erent value of cL: By moving cL
through all its support, we can obtain the shape of the whole EEF.
What we obtain in our numerical example is that the slope of the EEF is negative.
This means that for those combinations (cL;cH) to the left of the EEF curve, the pol-
icy reform to implement consists of rising cL and reducing cH: For those combinations
to the right of the EEF curve, the optimal policy reform is just the opposite. This
result is in line with the interpretation we gave to Condition (25) immediately after
Proposition 4. In fact, we could think of the EEF curve as a way of separating those
combinations (cL;cH) where the subsidy is too large and the condition holds (those
to the left of the curve), from those where the subsidy is too low and the condition
does not hold (those to the right of the curve).
Figure 5: Illustration of Proposition 4
We also ￿nd that the position of the EEF depends on the value of the educational
budget T. In particular, as we show in Figure 5 above, the EEF curve for rich
countries (in black), is above the EEF curve for poor countries (in red).19 Moreover,
if we focus on the group of rich countries, we ￿nd that the region where Condition
18For simplicity we assume that y follows a uniform distribution on [0;Y ]. Using the data in Table
2 for cL, cH and subsidies for higher education (Column Subs.) we compute a value of b a for each
country. Using these values of b a and given the college attendance levels (C.Att.) we can obtain a
value of p. Since b y = (1 ￿ ￿)cH(1 ￿ s) and p = 1 ￿ F(b y) = 1 ￿
b y
Y , once we have a value for b y and p
we can also compute Y .
19For both groups, we also obtain that the larger is ￿; the larger is the region in the space (cL;cH)
where Condition (25) holds.
24(25) fails (those combinations above the EEF curve) corresponds to extremely low
values of college attendance. This allows us to conclude that the empirically relevant
region for high income countries corresponds to the situation where Condition (25)
holds. However, this is not the case for poor countries, which con￿rms the result
illustrated in Figure 4. That is, as we move farther away from the origin, Condition
(25) will eventually fail. Once we reach low enough values of the subsidy, the iso-
equity lines become steeper relatively to the iso-productivity lines. Thus, the policy
reform for poor countries will eventually consist of increasing cH. This policy has the
e⁄ect of increasing the college subsidy so that a higher proportion of poor individuals
can a⁄ord college, which in turn implies an increase in college attendance. Although
this reform reduces the quality of basic education and the ability threshold for college
students, due to the increase in cH, the ￿nal quality of college students increases.
Finally we allow for decreasing returns to public expenditure in education (￿ < 1)
and in particular we repeat our calculations using a value ￿ = 0:9. We ￿nd that, the
lower is ￿; the larger is the region in the space (cL;cH) where Condition (25) holds.
In particular, as we show in Figure 5, the EEF curve for ￿ = 0:9 (in dotted line), is
above the EEF curve for ￿ = 1 (in solid line). In other words, the lower the marginal
return to public expenditure in education, the larger the increase in cL in order to
reach the EEF curve.
To illustrate further our results in Corollary 3 and Proposition 4, we present in
Table 4 an example of the e⁄ects of two di⁄erent policy changes on the di⁄erent
objectives of the government. We focus on the case of rich countries and we use the
numbers from Table 2 to ￿x an initial situation with cL = $88;000 and cH = $50;000,
respectively. The corresponding values of QS(cL;cH), b y(cL;cH), ￿(cL;cH) and QT are
also computed, together with the values of b s and p. This initial situation is in the
￿rst column of Table 4.
Table 4: Budget division and public intervention1
￿ :56 = 50
88 :48 = 44
91 :66 = 57
86
b s :739 :711 :748
p :625 :634 :588
￿ :352 :320 :352
QS 123;917 123;902 125;957
QT 100;650 101;534 100;060
1cL and cH are in thousand dollars:
We consider two alternative policies. In the ￿rst one we transfer resources from
higher education to basic education while in the second one we do just the opposite.
In particular, in the second column we consider a 12% reduction in cH and a
3.4% increase in cL. New values are cL = $91;000 and cH = $44;000: Once all
variables reach a new equilibrium, we ￿nd that the subsidy becomes lower. However,
25we observe that the proportion of individuals who can a⁄ord college increases from
62.5% to 63.4% meaning that this policy has a positive e⁄ect on equity. As we see
in the table, it has also a positive e⁄ect on both measures of productivity, but at the
cost of a negative e⁄ect on college attendance.
In the third column we consider a 2.27% reduction in cL and a 14% increase in cH.
New values are cL = $86;000 and cH = $57;000: This policy has a positive impact on
the subsidy. Regarding the di⁄erent objectives of the government, we ￿nd a negative
e⁄ect on equity since the value of p reduces from 62.5% to 58.8%. There is also a
positive e⁄ect on the productivity of college students. However, the e⁄ect on the
average level of productivity across the population QT is negative. As predicted by
Proposition 3, moving resources towards higher education will have a negative e⁄ect
either on equity or on productivity. On top of this, as seen in the reduction on QT;
the increase in QS (the average productivity of college graduates) is not enough to
compensate the reduction in the productivity of unskilled workers (cL).
4 Conclusion and Discussion
The main result of this paper is that, except in the special case in which the economy
is at the EEF curve, there is always a policy reform that increases the productivity
of college graduates without excluding the talented poor from college. For most rich
countries, this policy consists of transferring resources from college to basic education.
In addition we ￿nd that this policy has always a positive e⁄ect on the average level
of human capital across the population.
Throughout the paper we have assumed that capital markets are imperfect (￿ <
1): Here we want to comment brie￿ y on the e⁄ect of removing this assumption. If
￿ = 1; then equity is no longer a concern for the government since in that case all
individuals can attend college, irrespective of family income. The trade-o⁄ between
equity and e¢ ciency disappears. One interesting implication is that, in this case, the
government could ￿x a large value of both cL and cH; such that s = 0 in order to
achieve e¢ ciency. That is, if capital markets work perfectly college education should
be privately ￿nanced.
There are many possible extensions of this work. One possibility would be to
study other objectives to represent e¢ ciency. For example, we could assume that the
government tries to increase average lifetime income within a cohort which implies
rising average consumption of the cohort in period 2.20 Thus, the main di⁄erence
with average human capital above is that now we are subtracting the monetary cost
of higher education paid by students. We have some partial results regarding the
e⁄ects of policy reforms on this objective. In particular, we ￿nd that as long as the
indirect e⁄ect of changes in both cL and cH through s and ￿ is not very large, a policy
consisting of transferring resources from college to basic education that has a positive
20This objective has been analyzed by Lloyd-Ellis (2000) and Su (2004). Blankeneau et al (2002)
analyze the lifetime income (or welfare levels) of each group of workers in a separate way.
26e⁄ect on QS will also have a positive e⁄ect on the average lifetime income within a
cohort.
Another extension would be to relax the assumption that the two characteristics
that de￿ne individuals are independent. It is generally assumed that there is corre-
lation between parents￿ability and the ability of the child when, for example, IQ is
taken as a measure of ability. As parents￿income and parents￿ability are also cor-
related, the two characteristics in our model will be positively correlated. However,
if the two variables are correlated, the model becomes more complicated as the two
terms that de￿ne college attendance now cannot be separated. The outcome is that
the ability threshold will be lower for rich individuals than for poor individuals. One
possibility could be to rely on numerical simulations to see whether the results of the
paper change.
We believe that our results are relevant for several recent debates in the literature
on the economics of education. There is increasing evidence that shows the early
emergence and persistence of gaps in cognitive and non-cognitive skills (see among
others, Carneiro and Heckman (2003)). This issue is of special concern as, according
to recent evidence, family environments have deteriorated (Heckman and Masterov
(2004)).21 Studies that highlight the importance of increasing expenditure in early
childhood care in achieving both equity and e¢ ciency provide an interesting illus-
tration since, obviously, at the current level of resources, the rise of expenditure at
that level should be done at the expense of reducing expenditure in later educational
levels (see Heckman (2006)).
21In the US, the percentage of children born into, or living in, ￿nontraditional￿ families has
increased greatly in the last 30 years (about 25% of children are now born into single parent homes
now). ￿Nontraditional￿families include not only single-parent families but also families where the
parents are not married. The evidence found by Heckman and Masterov (2004) suggests that children
raised in these types of families fare worse in many aspects of social and economic life.
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Discussion on Assumption 1:
Sign of @b s
@cL:
We have to study the sign of the term in the numerator of @b s


























￿ is the elasticity of college attendance with respect to cL: So, the
derivative @b s
@cL will be negative, except in those situations where the negative e⁄ect of
cL on college attendance ￿ is very large. To illustrate the condition above, we take the
average values from Table 2, where ￿ = 0:32;b s = 0:782; and the ratio cH=cL = 0;61:
The condition becomes "￿
cL > ￿6:55: That is, the condition could only fail if the
elasticity "￿
cL is extremely large in absolute value.
Sign of @b s
@cH:













The sign of @b s
@cH is clearly negative if @￿
@cH > 0: We focus, therefore, on the case in which
@￿





the sign of @b s
@cH will be negative if "￿
cH > ￿1. That is, we require either that cH has
a positive e⁄ect on college attendance ￿ or, if the e⁄ect is negative, the size of this
e⁄ect cannot be very strong.
Slope of the iso-subsidies:













1 + b s￿￿"￿
cL
b s￿(1 + "￿
cH)
; (30)
where ￿ = cH=cL:
First, suppose that both "￿
cH and "￿







The lower is b s the higher is the absolute value of this expression. That is, the lower
is b s; the steeper are the iso-subsidies. Once we take into account the e⁄ect of both
"￿
cL and "￿
cH the result will hold as long as they are of small size, as we have discussed
above.
28Quasi-concavity of QS


















22(x) > 0: (32)












That is, we require diminishing returns to both factors and a positive cross e⁄ect.
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